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The Constitutionality of Censuring the President
JACK CHANEY*
The recent impeachment of President Clinton led some members of
Congress to propose censure as a penalty that would have punished the
President, yet stopped short of removing him from office. The author argues that
while actual conviction and removal from office is a drastic step, the use of
censure as an alternative is both dangerous and contrary to fundamental
Constitutional principles. After a discussion of Congress' attempt to censure
President Andrew Jackson during the Bank War, the author sets forth several
arguments against censure as a means ofpunishing the President. First, the use
of censure is impermissible because it acts as an unconstitutional Bill of
Attainder. Second, the censure of the President is impermissible given the textual
language of the United States Constitution. Finally, the author focuses on the
potential dangers that accompany Congress' ability to censure the President
Censure has the potential to upset the fundamental principe of separation of
powers-a principle that essential to the workings of the United States
Government
I. INTRODUCION
Joint Resolution-That it is the sense of Congress that (1) on January 20,
1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the oath prescribed by the Constitution of
the United States faithfully to execute the office ofPresident; implicit in that oath
is the obligation that the President set an example of high moral standards and
conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect for the truth; and William
Jefferson Clinton has egregiously failed in this obligation, and through his
actions has violated the trust of the American people, lessened their esteem for
the office of President and dishonored the office which they have entrusted to
him; (2) (A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements concerning his
reprehensible conduct with a subordinate; (B) William Jefferson Clinton
wrongly took steps to delay discovery of the truth; and (C) in as much as no
person is above the law, William Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal
and civil penalties; and (3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United
States, by his conduct has brought upon himself, and fully deserves, the censure
and condemnation of the American people and the Congress; and by his
signature on this Joint Resolution, acknowledges this censure and
condemnation.1
On December 19, 1998, President William Jefferson Clinton was impeached
* This Note is dedicated to friends and my family, Bob, Barbara, Sarah, and Anna, and my
grandparents, Jack, Fred, and Lucille, for their continued years of love and support. Never
forget your dreams for they are the essence of life.
1 This is the censure resolution proposed and voted down in the House Judiciary
Committee. See Judiciary Democrat's Resolution of Censure, WASH. PosT, Dec. 13, 1998, at
A28.
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by the House of Representatives, 2 becoming only the second President in United
States history to bear this ignominious "scarlet letter."'3 President Clinton was
later acquitted in the Senate.4 Unlike the experience of President Andrew
Johnson's impeachment, an alternative was cast into the mix. Public outcry over
the President's actions coupled with reluctance to see him removed from office
led congressional leaders from both parties and houses to propose a censure of
President Clinton that would have stopped short of conviction and removal from
office while still punishing him for his actions. Though this call for censure was
abandoned after President Clinton's acquittal in the Senate,5 the enormity of the
constitutional responsibility which may confront a future Congress demands an
objective factual and legal analysis of whether censure is both wise and
constitutional.
The Framers of the Constitution wisely adopted impeachment as the sole
means for "defending the Community [against] the incapacity, negligence or
perfidy of the Chief Magistrate."6 The inclusion of the impeachment clause7 in
our Constitution was not met with universal approval by those who engaged in
the debate over its necessity and wisdom,8 but no other means was provided in
the Constitution whereby Congress could check the abuses of the Executive. To
be sure, consideration of impeachment and removal from office will always be a
drastic step, but to permit an alternative allowing Congress to ignore the
responsibility vested in it is to create a dangerous precedent and subvert
fundamental constitutional principles.
This Note attempts to explain the relevant historical and constitutional
2 See Peter Baker & Juliet Eilperin, Clinton Impeached, House Approves Articles
Charging Perjury, Obstruction; Mostly Partisan Vote Shifts Drama to Senate, WASH. POST,
Dec. 20, 1998, at Al.
3 President Andrew Johnson was the first in 1868. See id
4 See Peter Baker & Helen Dewar, Clinton Acquitted; 2 Impeachment Articles Fail to Win
Senate Majority; Five Republicans Join Democrats in Voting Down Both Charges, WASH.
POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at Al.
5 See id
6 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 65 (Max Farrand ed. 1966)
[herienafter 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION]; ALEX SIMPSON, JR., A TREATISE ON
FEDERALIMPEACHMENTs 11 (1916).
7 See U.S. CONST. art II, § 4.
8 See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 64-69:
Mr. King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in favor of liberty might
enervate the Government we were forming .... [U]nder no circumstances ought [the
President] to be impeachable by the Legislature. Iis would be destructive to his
independence and of the principles of the Constitution. He relied on the vigor of the




framework underlying the constitutionality of censure. The question is not
whether censure is politically and publicly expedient, but instead whether censure
comports with traditional principles of good government and the Constitution.
Whether censure of the President becomes a regular occurrence on the political
landscape may well depend on the answer to this question. As this Note will
show, censure violates perhaps the most important bulwark of our country's
liberties and rights: the separation of powers.9
Perhaps few issues abound with more significance than whether one branch
of government may, with constitutional blessing, punish and denounce another
coequal branch. This Note argues that constitutional blessing would be absent
were censure to occur. Part HI begins this effort with a historical analysis of the
censure of President Andrew Jackson. As this Note will show, there is a
fundamental difference between a house of Congress censuring its own members
and censuring the president Part 111 continues with a discussion on the
Constitution's prohibition on bills of attainder.10 History and Supreme Court
precedent demonstrate that censure falls squarely within this prohibition. Further
emphasis will be placed on the exact nature of what a censure is, a "scarlet letter."
Part IV.A focuses on a textual analysis of the Constitution, demonstrating that
Congress lacks constitutional power to punish a coequal branch of government
Additional attention is paid in this section to show that censure is not an incidental
power arising from the authority of impeachment; the two serve different
purposes. Part IVB expounds on the danger legislative censure of the President
would cause to the fundamental principle of separation of powers; censure has the
potential to upset the balance of our government, with potentially disastrous
results. Taken as a whole, this discussion demonstrates the unconstitutionality of
censuring the President.
I. THE CENSURE OF ANDREW JACKSON
A- The Bank War
On March 28, 1834, President Andrew Jackson was censured by the
Senate. 1 By a vote of twenty-six to twenty it was resolved, "[t]hat the
President ... has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the
constitution and laws, but in derogation of both."12 Jackson, indignant and ever
9 See THE FERAisT NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961) ("The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands ... may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny .... [TIhe preservation of liberty requires,
that the three great departments of power should be separate and distinct").
10 See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
11 See 10 CONG. DEB. 1187 (1834); ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE
BANKWAR 141 (1967).
12 10 CONG. DEB. 1187(1834).
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the fighter, fired back with a '"Protest," which was ordered by the Senate not to be
entered into its Journal.13 As is the way with politics, power changed hands and
the Democrats gained control of the Senate, expunging the censure resolution in
1837.14
The events leading up to this constitutional confrontation were themselves a
test of the separation of our government's powers. Andrew Jackson created a
political and constitutional upheaval during his Presidency which stirred the
winds against him. In 1816, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United
States.15 The Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland upheld the
constitutionality of the Bank by denying states the power to levy taxes upon
them.16 Perhaps it was a premonition of things to come that Jackson had opposed
the admission of branches of the Bank of the United States to Tennessee, giving
his personal approval and support in 1817 to a Tennessee law that imposed a
prohibitive tax of fifty-thousand dollars a year on each branch.17 Though this
occurred before the Supreme Court's decision in McCulloch, it foretold of "Old
Hickory's"'18 aversion to the Bank's existence.
Andrew Jackson used the veto power twelve times during his Presidency,
more than all of the previous Executive vetoes combined 19 While properly
chargeable with making the veto power a significant presidential instrument in
directing legislation, President Jackson's frequent use of the veto dramatically
13 See 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1288-1313 (James D. Richardson,
ed., 1897) [hereinafter 3 PAPERS oF THE PRESIDENTS]; see also REMINI, supra note 11, at 142-
45.
14 See 13 CONG. DEB. 504 (1837). The resolution read in part as follows:
Resolved, That the said resolve be expunged from the journal, and, for that purpose, that
the Secretary of the Senate... shall bring the manuscriptjournal ... into the Senate, and,
in the presence of the Senate, draw black lines round the said resolve, and write across the
face thereof, in strong letters, the following words: "Expunged by order of the Senate, this
16th day of January, in the year of our Lord 1837."
Id. The Secretary did in fact "proceed to draw black lines entirely round the resolution, and to
endorse across the lines the words '[e]xpunged by order of the Senate, this 16th day of January,
1837. No sooner had this been done, than hisses, loud and repeated, were heard from various
parts of the gallery." Id.
15 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US. 316 (1819).
16 See id.
17 See MARQUIS JAMES, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 557 (1938). The tax was later
repealed, but only over his protest. See id. at 558.
18 "Old Hickory" was President Jackson's nickname. He acquired the sobriquet during the
War of 1812 after one of his soldiers was heard to have said that Jackson was "tough as
hickory," naming the toughest thing he knew. See REMINI, supra note 11, at 21.
19 See REMIN, supranote 11, at 81.
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altered the balance of power between the Legislative and Executive branches. 2
As Senator Daniel Webster remarked, Jackson's assertion of the veto power
"claim[ed] for the President, not the power of approval, but the primary power,
the power of originating laws."21
However, it was Jackson's veto of the recharter of the National Bank on July
10, 183222 which was perhaps the most important veto ever made by a President.
He made both political and emotional reasons for his veto, but it was his views on
the Bank's constitutionality which drew ire from Congress. Noting that the
Supreme Court in McCulloch had ruled the Bank to be constitutional, Jackson
declared: "To this conclusion I cannot assent."23 President Jackson stated that, in
addition to the Supreme Court, Presidents and the Congress also had the
responsibility of following the Constitution, and that his veto of the Bank's
recharter followed from that responsbility3 4
Though Jackson's viewpoint may be widely regarded today as proper, it was
labeled by his opponents as extreme. Webster declared that "no President and no
public man ever before advanced such doctrines in the face of the nation. There
never was before a moment in which any President would have been tolerated in
asserting such a claim to despotic power."2 5 Senator Henry Clay, the eventual
proponent of Jackson's censure, thought this assumed power to intrude upon the
legislative process, declaring that such action was "hardly reconcilable with the
genius of representative govemment. '26 These men and others saw Jackson's
20 See id
21 See DANIEL WEBSTER, 3 THm WORKS OF DANIEL WEBsrER 446 (Boston, Little Brown
1864).
22 See REMINI supra note 11, at 82. The Bank's existing charter was to have expired in
1836. See id at 109.
23 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1144-45 (James D. Richardson ed.,
1896) [hereinafter 2 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS]. In addition, Jackson continued with a
statement considered as radical ever heard till then concerning our separation of powers, though
he was misunderstood.
It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President
to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to
them for passage or approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before
them for judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President is
independent of both.
Id. at 1145. President Jackson later clarified this statement, explaining that he meant to state that
each branch of the government has its own responsibility to follow the Constitution, and that in
the matter of the Bank he did not agree with the Supreme Court See REMINI, szra note 11, at
83.
24 See id
25 see WEBSTER, supra note 21, at 434.
26 HENRY CLAY, 7 THE WORKS OF HENRY CLAY 524 (Calvin Colton ed., 1904).
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newly assumed powers as inherently tending towards a monarchy, complete with
its tyranny.
President Jackson's antipathy towards the Bank was well known and became
a primary focus of the Presidential election of 1832. The National Republicans,
led by their Presidential candidate Henry Clay, excoriated Jackson for his veto of
the Bank's recharter.27 However, Jackson saw many problems with the bank,
feeling that its existence was unconstitutional and counterproductive.
Furthermore, Jackson saw the Bank as corrupt and as exerting too much power
over the public and government.28
President Jackson won his reelection campaign in 1832 and became ever
more aggressive towards the Bank, the charter of which was to expire in 1836.
Jackson warned congressman James Polk that despite his veto of its recharter, the
Bank, "the hydra of corruption," was "only scotched, not dead.'2 9 Jackson thus
began debating with his Cabinet the possibility of removing the deposits from the
Bank and putting them into state banks.30 Before Congress could reconvene,
Jackson announced publicly that starting October 1, 1833, the government would
stop depositing its funds in the Bank, furthermore, Jackson told his cabinet that
the deposits already in the Bank would be incrementally withdrawn.31
Unfortunately for Jackson, his Treasury Secretary William J Duane refused
to carry out his order, and would not resign.32 As Duane was charged with the
responsibility and power of removing the deposits, Jackson was faced with a
quandary. By law, Duane was obligated to report to Congress his reasons should
he remove the deposits, and was unwilling to remove them while Congress was in
recess.3 3 Jackson never doubted his constitutional ability to remove subordinate
officers and promptly told Duane his services would no longer be needed,
replacing him with Roger B. Taney 4 Taney, sympathetic to Jackson's plan,
promptly put the President's plan into order, thereby replacing a national banking
system with one of deposit banking.
27 See RezN, supra note 11, at 92-93 (describing the National Republicans'
characterization of the National Bank as this "great and beneficial institution ... maintaining a
sound, ample, and healthy state of the currency may be said to supply the body politic,
economically viewed, with a continual stream of life-blood, without which it must inevitably
languish and sink into exhaustion").
28 President Jackson stated: "The Bank of the United States, a great moneyed monopoly,
had attempted to obtain a renewal of its charter by controlling the elections of the people and
the action of the Govemment." See 3 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 13, at 1306.
2 9 DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREV JACKSON 186 (1993).
30 See id. at 187.
31 See id. at 194; REMiNI, supra note 11, at 122-23.
32 SeeREMIN, supranote 11, at 122-23.





Andrew Jackson exerted prerogatives never before seen but enjoyed by
Presidents ever since his time. His censure and condemnation on the Journal of
the Senate were a direct result of these exertions. Had Jackson been cowed by the
intimidation attempted by the Senate, our system of government would likely be a
different one. The Senate's punishment of Jackson for his legitimate exercise of
these powers should give pause to anyone considering the wisdom of censure as a
legislative prerogative.35 Yet, it is necessary to examine in full the justifications
for and defenses against the propriety and constitutionality of this action in order
to fully understand why censure was never intended by our Framers.
Henry Clay, defeated by Jackson in the 1832 election, was the leading
proponent of the censure resolution, which denounced Jackson's actions and fixed
his punishment as indelible disgrace on the Journal of the Senate.3 6 Clay
generally confined his denouncement of Jackson to Jackson's actions in firing
Duane and removing the Bank deposits, but it was clear that Clay and his
supporters were also motivated by a desire to condemn Jackson's use of the veto:
"The general currency of the country, the life-blood of all its business is in the
most imminent danger of universal disorder and confusion. The power of internal
improvement lies crushed beneath the veto."37
In his speech supporting the resolution to censure Jackson, Clay employed
demagoguery to condemn the President's use of his powers: "We are ... in the
midst of a revolution, hitherto bloodless, but rapidly tending towards a total
change of the pure republican character of the Government, and to the
concentration of all power in the hands of one man."38 Clay and his supporters
were attempting to intimidate the President to follow their commands. Congress
felt that any usurpations of those powers required the punishment of infamy. Had
Jackson acceded to these reprobations and given way to legislative dominance,
we might have a different system of government than we do today.3 9
35 Obviously, a difference in opinion over the proper use of the veto and removal powers
of a President is different than the recent debate over the blameworthiness, personal and legal,
of President Clinton. Yet, the fimdamental subject of congressional inquiry can never be
determinative of censure's propriety and constitutionality. For instance, upon whom would the
duty devolve to make the initial determination that a given presidential action is a proper subject
of the claimed power to censure? The answer is of course Congress, but Congress is ill suited,
even in cases of impeachment, to impartially rule upon the blameworthiness of a President. A
legislative trial of any person, President or ordinary citizen, carries with it the fumdamental
dangers sought to be avoided by the inclusion of the Bill of Attainder clause in the Constitution.
See infra discussion Part IT.
36 See 10 CONG. DEB. 58 (1834); COLE, supra note 29, at 205-06; JAMEs, supra note 17,
at 656; REMINI, supra note 11, at 137-39.
37 10 CONG. DFB. 59 (1834).
38 d.39 Many of us an generally recall vetoes in the past that garnered our personal support or
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We live in a country today where popular support is often the primary
instrument in moving along public legislation. Jackson employed this tool in the
Executive as never before seen.' ° Clay condemned him for this as well, stating
"[b]y what authority does the President derive power from the mere result of an
election?" 41
Clay openly condemned Jackson for days on his alleged "open, palpable and
daring usurpation 42 of the Constitution; if Jackson had said something, it was
open to recrimination; if Jackson had performed an official act, it was subject to
rebuke. In short, Clay and his supporters were determined to limit the power of
their political enemy by any means possible. Yet, when it was complained of that
the proper method for condemning the President's actions was impeachment,
Clay discarded the idea as "impracticable."43 Clay, when confronted with the
argument that the censure resolution was judicial in character and therefore
outside of proper legislative powers, countered that the resolution was "not
judicial, either in its form or purposes; that it was next to impossible to bring the
President to trial upon an impeachment, if that were designed."44 This
doublespeak, recognizing on one hand the need to distance the resolution from
being associated with impeachment, and on the other recognizing that censure
was the only alternative he could conjure to impeachment (given the lack of
support), demonstrates Clay's awareness of the thin constitutional ice upon which
he tread.
C. Jackson 's "'Protest"
Upon passage of the resolution, President Jackson fired back, "perfectly
convinced that the discussion and passage of the above mentioned resolution were
not only unauthorized by the Constitution, but in many respects repugnant to its
provisions and subversive of the rights secured by it to other coordinate
departments." 45 Jackson was perfectly aware of the importance this issue raised:
opposition. In some cases use of the veto will do good, in others ill. However, few today would
doubt the ultimate wisdom of vesting in the Executive Branch the power of the "qualified
negative." THE FEDERALM, No. 73, at 494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
Alexander Hamilton stated that the "primary inducement to conferring the power in question
upon the executive is, to enable him to defend himself: the secondary is to increase the chances
in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence or
design." Id. at 495. In this vein, it is ironic that Jackson was censured partly because he was
employing a constitutional tool implemented to enable him to defend the powers of the
Executive Branch against legislative encroachment
4 0 SeeREMINI, supranote 11, at46, 107.
41 10 CONG. DEB. 65 (1833).
42 10 CONG. DEB. 58-74, 1171-88 (1834).
43 10 CoNG.DEB. 1174(1834).
44Id. at 1172.
45 3 PAPRs OF THE P.sENTS, supra note 13, at 1289.
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Does a coequal branch of government have the authority to pronounce upon and
discredit the President of the United States, except in cases of impeachment?
Jackson felt strongly that the answer was no.
Aware that the Senate had assumed upon itself a judicial function
unauthorized by the Constitution4 6 Jackson proceeded to demonstrate how
impeachment was the only constitutional course proscribed for Congress. Indeed,
he stated that the Senate had, by a majority, albeit less than necessary two-thirds
concurrence, pronounced him "guilty of an impeachable offense" 47 Jackson
declared that the only constitutional means by which the Senate could subject him
to its judicial power was "in the cases and under the forms prescribed by the
Constitution." 48 He found it just as repugnant to the Constitution that he had been
judged guilty of an impeachable offense by less than two-thirds of the members
present.4 9
That President Jackson considered this as a stain and taint is certain. In
remarking upon his censure proponent Henry Clay, Jackson remarked, "[o]h, if I
live to get these robes of office off me... I will bring the rascal to a dear
account" 5 0 It is equally certain that Jackson was concerned with his legacy, for in
his "Protest," he eloquently described as the bitterest portion of a pronouncement
of guilty by the Senate the disgrace upon his honor throughout history.51
The issue that most enraged Jackson was that he felt he had acted in
accordance with the Constitution and the public interest Jackson saw corruption
and abuse as the defining characteristics of the Bank;52 not only were its policies
unsound, but the Bank had attempted to directly influence the 1832 election, and
46 See id. at 1292 (stating that "the whole phraseology and sense of the resolution seem to
be judicial").
47 Id. Jackson's protest stated that "[t]he resolution, then, was in substance an
impeachment of the President, and in its passage amounts to a declaration by a majority of the
Senate that he is guilty of an impeachable offense." Id.
4 8 Id.
4 9 See id. at 1294.
50 RE i, supra note 11, at 139 (citing 3 JAMEs PARTON, THE LFE OF ANDREW JACKSON
542 (New York, Mason Bros., 1861).
51 As Jackson stated:
Mhough neither removal from office nor future disqualification ensues, yet it is not to be
presumed that the fiamers of the Constitution considered either or both of those results as
the whole of the punishment they prescribed. The judgment of guity by the highest
tibunal in the Union, the stigma it would inflict on the offender, his family, and fame, the
perpetual record on the Journal, handing down to future generations the story of his
disgrace, were doubtless regarded by them as the bitterest portions, if not the very essence,
of that punishment.
3 PAPERS OF THE PREsIDENT, supra note 13, at 1295.
52 See id. at 85; REMvN4 supra note 11, at 44-45.
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numerous instances were discovered tending to show the Bank was bribing
government officials. 53 Furthermore, Jackson soundly felt that he had precedent
on his side when he dismissed Duane as Treasury Secretary: "Nearly forty-five
years had the President exercised, without a question as to his rightful authority,
those powers for the recent assumption of which he is now denounced."54
Jackson saw the Senate's action as an attempt to control the President's direction
of his Cabinet.
President Jackson was also deeply concerned about the precedent the
Senate's action might set. He felt the censure resolution presupposed a right in the
Senate to interfere with legitimate exercise of presidential power. To this, Jackson
forcibly replied that dangerous results might follow:
If the principle be once admitted, it is not difficult to perceive where it may end.
If by a mere denunciation like this resolution the President should ever be
induced to act in a matter of official duty contrary to the honest convictions of his
own mind in compliance with the wishes of the Senate, the constitutional
independence of the executive department would be as effectually destroyed and
its power as effectually transferred to the Senate as if that end had been
accomplished by an amendment of the Constitution.55
Jackson wisely foresaw that Congress might similarly attempt in the future to
subordinate other cabinet departments to its will instead of that of the President 56
Of course, if Congress could succeed in influencing presidential actions once, it
could do so again as to any matter with which they and the President might
disagree.
The arguments which ultimately led to the expungement of Jackson's censure
from the Senate's Journal rested primarily on the same principles and arguments
used by Jackson in his "Protest" Jackson's Democratic supporters considered the
act to be a judicial one outside the Senate's jurisdiction, as a bad precedent and as
a violation of the separation of powers.57
53 See REm , supra note 11, at 98-99.
54 3 PAPERS OFT EPRESiDENTsupra note 13, at 1305.
55 Id.
56 See id.
57 See 13 CONG. DEB. 380-418, 428-506 (1837). Numerous speakers rose to Jackson's
defense. Senator Benton stated that the resolve, "in all its various shapes and forms, was
unfounded and erroneous in point of fact, and therefore unjust and unrighteous, as well as
irregular and unauthorized by the constitution.' Id. at 381. Senator Dana pointed out how the
Senate had assumed powers not granted to it by the Constitution in stating that "the sentence of
condemnation contained in this resolution was ajudicial act, and could only have been done by
ajudicial tribunal." Id. at 393. He also feared the censure should be expunged:
[L]est it should be considered as a precedent I; sir, it is permitted to remain, at some
future period of great excitement, when passion and prejudice shall triumph over reason,
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What lessons are to be learned of this episode? Perhaps the first to be learned
is that our Constitution has survived many crises. The second, and more germane,
is that the "club" of Congressional condemnation can be employed for political
and partisan purposes; in holding this weapon over the head of a President, a
genuine danger arises that a President less resolute than Old Hickory might be
cowed to abandon his principles and convictions for fear of the damage to his
legacy. It is not difficult to conceive of an irresolute Executive being susceptible
to this intimidation. Finally, it is important to note that in expunging the resolution
Jackson's supporters felt they were putting an end to its legitimacy; its danger was
all too clear given its then present use.
fI. CENSURE As ATrAiNDER
Andrew Jackson forgot to explicitly mention one unconstitutional aspect of
the censure resolution condemning him: It possessed every aspect of a Bill of
Attainder, which is expressly forbidden by the Constitution. 8 The Supreme
Court, in Cummings v. Missouri, declared that a Bill of Attainder "is a legislative
act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial."59 The prohibition is
"intended not as a narrow, technical... prohibition, but rather as an
implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against
legislative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply-trial by
legislature."60 If censure is intended as a punishment then it must fall within this
constitutional prohibition.6'
and the constitution shall be made to subserve the purposes of disappointed
ambition... we may see the same scenes... acted over again; and the power of the Chief
Magistrate broken, and that branch of the Government prostrated at the feet of this.
Id. at 395.
58 See U.S. CONST. art 1, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed.).
59 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,323 (1866).
60 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965).
61 Admittedly, the meaning of "censure" is an amorphous one subject to the circumstances
in which it is employed. Black's Law Dictionary defines "censure' as "[a]n official reprimand
or condemnation.' BLACK'S LAw DICnONARY 224 (6th ed. 1990). However, the weight and
historical significance of a resolution of censure will largely depend on several factors.
Obviously, the notoriety and importance of the public official censured will matter greatly as to
history; the censure of a first-term congressmen will not be possessed of the same import as one
attached to the legacy of a President. In addition, the wording and language affixed to the
resolution will indelibly affix to the recipient's name the opprobrium Congress wishes to
convey; a censure resolution which simply states that one is "a bad person" will obviously not
carry the same weight as one which delineates the very conduct for which the person is being
censured. Furthermore, the pomp and circmistance connected to a censure resolution will affect
the weight in which it is seen. If Congress conveys to the public that censure is a punishment, as
with President Clinton, then its significance will vary according to the severity Congress
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A. The English Practice ofAttainder
The prohibition against bills of attainder62 was adopted by the Constitutional
Convention unanimously and without debate.63 The Framers were readily aware
of its pernicious and despotic use in England and did not consider its use
legitimate in a system based on separation of powers. To appreciate the Framers'
antipathy towards bills of attainder, one must possess an understanding of its use
in England.
Attainder was a weapon used by the English legislature to politically charge,
judge and sentence citizens of all classes and political power.6 4 Never infused
with even basic notions of due process, citizens would be found guilty of offenses
that they were either innocent of or had never before existed.6 5 Numerous
examples abound, but a few will explain its pernicious use. Blackstone relates a
statute enacted during the reign of King William III which stated that any person
who was educated in or made a profession of the Christian religion, "by writing,
printing, teaching, or advised speaking," who denied the truth of Christianity or
the divine authority of the Scriptures, was rendered, for the first offense, incapable
of holding any place or office of trust; for the second offense, was rendered
incapable of bringing any action, or of being guardian, executor, legatee, or
purchaser of lands. In addition he was subject to three years imprisonment 66
A real danger which existed from use of attainders was the lack of
impartiality on the part of persons comprising both judge and jury. Political
passions and influence were the dominant authorities in these legislative trials.6 7
ascribes to it. In suni, the meaning of a particular resolution of censure will largely depend on
the importance Congress attaches to it.
62 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
63 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 441; JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
586, 621,688, 706, 728-29, 755 (E. H. Scott ed., 1893).
64 See generally Cummings, 71 U.S. at 320--25 (relating some of the English experiences
with bills of attainder and holding that required test oaths under the Missouri State Constitution
violated the Attainder Clause).
65Id.
66 4 W.LAMBLACKSTONE, COmMENTARIES *44.
67 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 443-46; 1 COOLEY, CONMrrTIONAL LwrTATONS 536-37
(8th ed. 1927); 3 JOHN C. HAMILTON, HISTORY OF THE REPUBiC OF TE UNITED STATES 34
(1868) (citing Alexander Hamilton). Macaulay describes a particularly vivid account of this
danger in describing the attainder of Sir John Fenwick:
Some hundreds of gentlemen, every one of whom had much more than half made up his
mind before the case was open, performed the office both ofjudge and jury. They were not
restrained, as a judge is restrained, by the sense of responsibility ... They were not
selected, as ajury is selected, in a manner which enables a culprit to exclude his personal
and political enemies. The arbiters of the prisoner's fate came in and went out as they
chose. They heard a fragment here and thereof what was said against him, and a fragment
here and there of what was said in his favor. During the progress of the bill they were
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As Justice Story stated, "[b]ills of this sort, have been most usually passed in
England in times of rebellion, or gross subserviency to the crown, or of violent
political excitements; periods, in which all nations are most liable (as well the free
as the enslaved) to forget their duties, and to trample upon the rights and liberties
of others."68
As to the punishments, many consisted of loss of life; if the punishment was
short of death, the attainder was a "bill of pains and penalties."69 In addition, the
sentence carried with it a "corruption of blood," which meant that the attainted
person's heirs could not inherit his property.70 Either punishment is prohibited by
the Constitution.71 In 1810, Chief Justice Marshall stated that "a Bill of Attainder
may affect the life of an individual, or may confiscate his property, or may do
both.'72 Blackstone described some of the English punishments as consisting of
"exile or banishment by abjuration of the realm or transportation; others in loss of
liberty by perpetual or temporary imprisonment. Some extend to confiscation by
forfeiture of lands, or movables... others induce a disability of holding offices or
employments .... ,"73 However, the American definition of punishments was not
limited to a narrow technical interpretation.
B. The Framers'Intent
The Framers were adamant against the use of Bills of Attainder, seeing the
issue through the lens of separation of powers. As previously mentioned, there
was no debate during the Convention over its prohibition despite the Framers'
almost constant disagreement over most aspects of the Constitution. James
Madison aptly wrote that "[tjhe accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.' 74
The doctrine of separation of powers has been implemented by constitutional
exposed to every species of influence. One member might be threatened by the electors of
his borough with the loss of his seat ... In the debates arts were practised and passions
excited which are unknown to well-constituted tribunals, but fiom which no great popular
assembly divided into parties ever was or ever will be fe.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 445 n.19 (citing 9 LORD MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND FROM THE
ASSESSIONOFJAMESI at 207 (Charles Harding Firth ed., 1914).
68 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONTTrON § 1344 (5th ed. 1994).
69 Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323.
70 Brown, 381 U.S. at 441.
7 1 See id. at 447 (1965); Cummings, 71 U.S. at 323.
72 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,138 (1810).
73 BLACKSTONE, supra note 66, at *377.
74 THE FEDERA=sT, No. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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provisions which either grant power or forbid its use to certain branches of the
government. A fine example is Article IlI's grant of "the Judicial Power of the
United States,'7 5 which has been interpreted to grant exclusive authority to
certain areas while forbidding its use in others.76 In this manner are our liberties
preserved from autocratic and tyrannical rule.
History is replete with examples of the Executive Department overstepping
its bounds of authority, but our Constitution's Framers were most concerned with
the power of the Legislative Branch. There was great fear that the legislature
would supersede its granted authority and assume the powers of the other
departments, thereby depriving the people of their liberties.7 7 As Madison noted,
"in a representative republic ... where the legislative power is exercised by an
assembly... which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate
a multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the object of its
passions," certain barriers were necessary in order to keep it within its intended
sphere of action.78 The prohibition against bills of attainder was expressly
included in order to be such a barrier.79
75 US. CONSr. art. II, § 1.
76 See Commodity Future Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986)
(determining that Article MI "not only preserves to litigants their interest in an impartial and
independent federal adjudication of claims within the judicial power of the United States, but
also serves as 'an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances"');
see also Julian Velasco, Congressional Control over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of
the Traditional View, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. 671,711 (1997) (noting that "[in fact, the Framers
specifically rejected a proposal that would have given Congress control over the judicial
power").
77 Alexander Hamilton remarked upon this in The Federalist when he stated that "[t]he
propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of
the other departments, has been already more than once suggested." THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at
494 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
78 See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 334 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
79 See HAMILTON, supra note 67, at 34--35. John Hamilton quoted Alexander Hamilton as
saying:
Nothing is more common ... than for a free people, in times of passion, in times of heat
and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and
precedents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves. Of this kind is the doctrine of
disqualification, disfranchisement, and banishment by acts of the legislature. The
dangerous consequences of this power are manifest. If the legislature can disfranchise a
number of citizens at pleasure by general descriptions, it may soon confine all the votes to
a small number of partisans, and establish an aristocracy or an oligarchy, if it may banish
at discretion all those whom particular circumstances render obnoxious, without hearing or
trial, no man can be safe, nor know when he may be the innocent victim of a prevailing
faction. The name of liberty applied to such a government, would be a mockery of
common sense.
Id.; see also THE FEDERALISTNO. 44, at 301-02 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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Bills of attainder invariably arise from the heated passions of the day;,
majorities in the public are apt to ignore future consequences in pursuit of
expedient solutions to problems which may or may not exist. Short term problems
are resolved for those not affected by the attainting, but the Framers recognized
that the pendulum inevitably swings back, encapturing those in the same snare
they before thought wise. For this very reason Madison remarked that bills of
attainder are "contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every
principle of sound legislation. '80 Madison then remarked upon the experience
American citizens had undergone with the use of bills of attainder, stating that
"[t]hey have seen with regret and with indignation that... legislative
interferences, in cases affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the more-industrious and
less-informed part of the community."81 It is readily apparent that the prospect of
censure has indeed proven Madison correct recent supporters of censure were
"enterprising" in thrusting an unwarranted and unconstitutional red herring into
the impeachment arena, "snar[ing] ... the... less informed part of the
community.82"
Most important, it is evident that the Framers considered the prohibition
against bills of attainder to extend to congressional punishments of the President.
During the debates over the Impeachment Clause, George Mason was the driving
force behind its adoption.83 In arguing for the necessity of the Impeachment
Clause's inclusion in the Constitution, Mason pointed out that "[a]s [B]ills of
[A]ttainder... are forbidden, it is the more necessary to extend the power of
impeachments." 84 Moreover, the prohibition on attainting the President was
implicitly confirmed in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,85 in which
the Supreme Court considered and rejected a challenge by former President
Richard Nixon that a congressional Act calling for the preservation of his
8 0 T-ER FEALST No. 44, at 301 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
81 Id. at 207-08.
82 Id
83 See 5 JAMES MADISON, DEBATEs ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTmIrITION IN
THE CONVENTON HELD AT PHILADELPHIA iN 1787 at 147, 340, 528-29 (Jonathan Elliot ed.
1941) [hereinafter 5 ELLIOT's DEATEs]. In arguing for inclusion of an impeachment clause in
the Constitution, Mason stated that "[n]o point is of more importance than that the right of
impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above justice? Above all, shall that man
be above it who can commit the most extensive injustice?" Id. at 340. Moreover, it was Mason
who was largely responsible for the words stated in the impeachment clause which are debated
to this day, "high crimes and misdemeanors." Id. at 528.
84 Id. In addition, no one at the Convention argued that the Attainder Clause should not
apply to the President. Taken as a whole, this is persuasive authority that the Framers originally
intended impeachment and removal as the only means for addressing presidential misconduct
85 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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presidential materials and papers violated the Attainder Clause.86 The challenge
was rejected because the Act did not violate the clause, not because Presidents are
excepted from the Attainder prohibition.87 Thus, Presidents have the same right to
be free from Bills of Attainder as do ordinary citizens.
C. Censure as a Bill ofAttainder
From an objective viewpoint, congressional censure of the President appears
to fit all the criteria of a prohibited Bill of Attainder. However, in order to
accurately make this determination, analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence is
required. In particular, the determinative issue is whether censure is intended as a
punishment.
L.A Jurisprudential Analysis
Set against this constitutional prohibition, Congress is barred from passing
"legislative acts, no matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals
or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict
punishment on them without a judicial trial '88 Thus, Congress may not single out
individuals and cut off their compensation and thereafter bar them from
government service.89 Doing so, said the Supreme Court, "stigmatize[s] their
reputation and seriously impair[s] [the individuals'] chance to earn a living."90 In
addition, states may not require an "oath of loyalty" as a condition precedent to
holding certain jobs, that a person has not committed certain designated acts
during the time of a rebellion.91 Such an act is a "legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a judicial trial :"92 Punishment said the Supreme Court, is not
limited to those instances which deprive a person of "life, liberty, or property"9 3
Included under the Attainder protections are "freedom from outrage on the
feelings as well as restraints on the person."94
8 6 See id. at 484.
87 See id. at 468-84. In fact, the government did not even argue that the clause does not
apply to the President See id.
88 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,315 (1946).
8 9 See id. Congress had condemned the three persons as "irrespons ble, unrepresentative,
crackpot, radical bureaucrats" who were "affiliates of conunist front organizations." See 89
CONG. REc. 479 (1943).
9 0 Loveft, 328 U.S. at 314.
91 See Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1866) (holding that a Missouri
constitutional provision depriving persons of lawful profession upon failure to take a proscr'bed
loyalty oath violated the Bill of Attainder Clause of Constitution).
92 Id. at 323.




Another Supreme Court case concerning Bills of Attainder, Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services,95 is also pertinent to this issue. Concerned that
recently resigned President Richard Nixon might attempt to destroy certain
presidential materials which he had attempted to appropriate,9 6 Congress passed a
law ordering the General Services Administration to retain control over the
records.97 Nixon challenged the Act, arguing, inter alia, that the Act was a Bill of
Attainder.98 He argued that Congress passed the Act believing "that he had
engaged in misconduct ... and generally was deserving of a legislative judgment
of blameworthiness."99 The Supreme Court disposed of Nixon's argument
because it could find no evidence that the statute was intended to punish or
penalize him.100
In so finding, the Court employed a four-part analysis in order to determine
whether the statute was punitive.101 First; the Court reviewed the "infamous
history" of Bills of Attainder in order to determine whether the Act was of a
punitive nature. Beginning with English history, the Court reviewed American
experience with Attainder, concluding that Nixon had suffered none of "these
forbidden deprivations at the hands of Congress."'1 2 Although Nixon had been
deprived of property, the statute provided for 'just compensation"--therefore the
statute did not punitively confiscate his property.10 3 Thus, there was no feature of
the Act which fell under the historical meaning of legislative punishment.I4
95 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
96 See id. at 476.
97 See id. at 475.
98 See id. at 468. Nixon also argued, unsuccessfully, that the Act violated the principle of
separation of powers, presidential privilege, his privacy interests, and his First Amendment
association rights. See id. at 429.
99 Id. at 468. In a footnote, the Court noted, significantly, that "a legislative denunciation
and condemnation of an individual often act[s] to impose [forbidden] retroactive punishment."
Id. at 468 n.30.100 See id. at 476.
101 See id. at 473-84. The Court went on to state that "[iln judging the constitutionality of
the Act, we may only look to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of Congress who
voted its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of legitimate explanations for its
apparent effect." Id. at 484.
10 2 Id. at 475. American experience with Attainder includes a barring of Communist Party
members from holding offices in labor unions. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(1965); see also Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866) (strlldng down a loyalty
oath required of attorneys before they could practice law as a Bill of Attainder because it acted
as "a legislative decree of perpetual exclusion" from a lawful profession). But see Fleming v.
Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619 (1960) (holding that Social Security Act provision terminating the
benefits of aliens who are deported did not constitute a Bill of Attainder because there was no
"evidence of punitive intent).
103 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U. S. 425, 475 (1977).
104 See id.
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Second, the Court applied a functional test to determine the existence of
.punishment, "analyzing whether the law.., viewed in terms of the type and
severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive
legislative purposes." 105 If legitimate legislative purposes do not appear, the
Court will find it "reasonable to conclude" that punishment of affected individuals
was the purpose of the legislature.106 This inquiry is necessary because there is
always the possibility that new punishments might be designed by the legislature
which offend the Bill of Attainder guarantee. 107 The Court noted two facets of the
law affecting Nixon which furthered nonpunitive legitimate legislative ends. First,
Congress had the right to act to preserve materials which could aid in prosecution
of Watergate-related crimes; the threat of destruction of these materials was
expressly contemplated because of an agreement Nixon had entered into.108
Second, the Court found a legitimate public interest in access to presidential
materials; the materials' general historical importance coupled with an unbroken
precedent of voluntary presidential surrender of such records made their
preservation "of great value to the political health and vitality of the United
States." 109 Furthermore, the Act itself explicitly referred to these legitimate
purposes, thereby strengthening the implication that there was not a punitive
intent.110
The third test for determining an act's punitive intent is to inquire into the
legislative record.1 11 The Court found no legislative history leading to the
conclusion that Congress intended to punish Nixon; both the Senate and House
Committee Reports expressed no intent to penalize him, and the only legislative
105 Id. at 475-76.
10 6 Id. at 476.
10 7 See id at 475.
10 8 See id at 476-77.
109 Id. at 450,476-78.
110 See 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (current version at 44 U.S.C. § 2111 (1994); see also Nixon, 433
U.S. at 477 n.41 (citing S. REP. No. 93-1181, at 4 (1974)). The Senate report stated:
(1) To begin with, prosecutors, defendants, and the courts probably would be deprived of
crucial evidence bearing on the defendants' innocence or guilt of the Watergate crimes for
which they stand accused. (2) Moreover, the American people would be denied full access
to all facts about the Watergate affair, and the efforts of Congress, the executive branch,
and others to take measures to prevent a recurrence of the Watergate affair may be
inhibited.
Id.
11 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958) (stating that "[in
deciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally based its determination upon the
purpose of the statute. If the statute imposes a disability for the purpose of punishment-that is,
to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others ... it has been considered penal").
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history expressing intent was that indicating the regulative character of the Act 1 12
Significantly, there were no "aspersions on [Nixon's] personal conduct and... no
condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment." 13 In fact,
when the specter of attainder was raised in the Senate, the bill's sponsor
emphatically denied any intent to punish Nixon. 114 Furthermore, the absence of
punitive congressional sentiments "largely undercut[ ] a major concem that
prompted the [B]ill of [A]ttainder prohibition: the fear that the legislature, in
seeking to pander to an inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient
openly to assume the mantle of judge-or, worse still, lynch mob." 15
Strengthening this conclusion was the fact that Congress, in passing the statute,
expressly provided for its judicial review.11 6
Finally, the Court looks into whether less burdensome alternatives exist "by
which that legislature... could have achieved its legitimate non-punitive
objectives. 11 7 In Nixon, the Court found the Act to be a reasonable method for
securing its desired ends: protection of evidence and historical materials. 18 The
Act, the Court reasoned, might very well have been the least burdensome method
by which to gain Nixon's cooperation in the preservation of the presidential
materials.119
Rudimentary scrutiny of any censure resolution inevitably leads to the
conclusion that it is a Bill of Attainder. First, censure is undoubtedly a legislative
act; second, it applies to a named individual. Although there is a trial involved, it
is not judicial. 120 Nearly every Attainder will be accompanied by some form of
trial, whether it be one involving aspects of due process or simply a sham. The
more crucial inquiry must be made concerning censure's punitive nature.
Applying the Supreme Court's four-step analysis in Nixon clearly
demonstrates that censure is of a punitive nature. As to the first part of the Nixon
test, there is judicial precedent characterizing censure as a Bill of Attainder. In
United States v. Brown,1 21 the Supreme Court struck down as a Bill of Attainder a
statute which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an
112 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478.
113 Id. at 479.
114 Senator Ervin stated that "[tlhis bill does not contain a word to the effect that Mr.
Nixon is guilty of any violation of the law. It does not inflict any punishment on him." 120
CONG. REC. 33959 (1974).
115 433 US. at 480.
116 Seeid. at481-82.
117 Id. at 482.
118 See id. at 478-79.
119 See id. at 483.
120 For a discussion on censure's resemblance, or lack thereof to impeachment, see infra
Part IV. A.
121 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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officer or employee of a labor union.122 The Court, in distinguishing the statute at
issue from a previously upheld one, noted that the upheld statute "incorporate[d]
no judgment censuring or condemning any man or group of men."123 Because the
statute at issue did incorporate, in part, such a judgment of censure and
condemnation, it was struck down.124
In addition, there is illuminating precedent in a failed censure resolution
which Congress attempted to enact in 1794. The censure resolution did no more
than declare that certain specified persons were involved in an insurrection. 125
James Madison objected, stating "[it is in vain to say that this indiscriminate
censure is no punishment. If it falls on classes, or individuals, it will be a severe
punishent .... Is not this proposition, if voted, a vote of attainder?" 126 Even the
censure resolution's supporters did not argue about the resolution's punitive
nature; they simply countered that the resolution applied to a general group, none
by name. 127 The resolution went to defeat, seventy-three votes to nineteen,128
with Madison's views a focus of the debate.129
The second step of the Nixon test also demonstrates the punitive nature of
censuring the President. Censure cannot "reasonably" be said to "further non-
punitive legislative purposes."'130 Unlike in N'mon, there exists no need to
preserve evidence or historical materials; censure is punishment of an individual,
constitutionally unsanctioned in the absence of an express authority. In this
manner, the process of impeachment and removal from office is a constitutionally
sanctioned Bill of Attainder.1 31 It may be argued that censuring the President
122 See id. at 462.
123 Id. at 453-54.
124 See id.
125 See 4 ANNALS OF CoNG. 932 (1794). The censure resolution read in part as follows:
In tracing the origin and progress of the insurrection, we can entertain no doubt that certain
combinations of men, careless of consequences and disregarding the truth, by
disseminating suspicions, jealousies, and accusations, of the Government, have had all the
agency you [then President Washington] ascribe to them, in fomenting this daring outrage
against social order and the authority of the laws.
Id.
126 Id. at 934.
127 See id. at 938 (remarks of Sen. Dexter stating that "it is punishment in the abstract,
without an object punished").
128 Id. at 945.
129 See id. at 932-45.
130 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,475-76 (1977).
131 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONsTurON, supra note 6,
at 64-69. For example, Benjamin Franklin stated that "[i]t would be the best way therefore to
provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive when his misconduct
should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal when he should be unjustly accused." Id at
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justly stems from the power of impeachments, but this issue will be discussed in
Part V.A; what is important for present purposes is that censure is in fact a
punishment Censure's punitive nature is therefore strengthened not only by its
asserted proximity to impeachment, but by its lack of legitimate legislative
purpose.
The conclusion that censure serves no purpose other than to punish an
allegedly blameworthy or guilty President is reinforced by the congressional
practice of censuring its own members. Article 1, § 5, clause 2 of the Constitution
gives each house of Congress the power to "punish its Members for disorderly
Behavior."132 Through this power Congress has censured its own members. 133
Furthermore, this power has been described by the Supreme Court as a 'Judicial
power,"'134 thereby adding to the conclusion that censuring the President is
attainting him. If Congress is censuring its members under its express power to
punish them, then, afortiori, censure of the President is punishment as well.
Current members of Congress who considered the impeachment articles
against President Clinton were readily aware of the punitive nature of censuring
the President Under the third step of the Nixon test, searching the legislative
record, there can be no other conclusion than that censure is intended as
punishment Censure proponents in the House Judiciary Committee, on numerous
occasions, referred to censure as the best means by which to punish the President
For example, Congressman Martin Meehan, a Democrat supporter of censuring
the President, stated in favor of such a resolution that it is intended as a
punishment: "If you want to punish the President or brand the President with a
scarlet letter or stamp him on his forehead, censure is the way to do that'1 35 Floor
65; see also Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation ofPower and Substantive
Constitutional Restrictions and its Use in the Lovetl Trop, Perez and Speiser Cases, 34 IND.
L.J. 231,236 (1959).
132 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
133 See, e.g., Senate Election, Expulsion, and Censure Casesfrom 1789 to 1960, S. Doc.
NO. 87-71 at 94-97 (1962). Senators John L. McLaurin and Benjamin R. Tillman of South
Carolina were censured for a fight on the Senate floor. The Senate document noted that "[t]he
penalty, thus, was censure and suspension for 6 days-which had already elapsed since the
assault.") Id. at 96.
134 Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 169 (1880) (holding that Congress had no
power to declare a witness in contempt for refusing to answer questions concerning his
business).
135 Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States,
Consideration ofArticles ofImpeachment: Hearings Before the House Judiciay Comm., 105th
Cong., 2d Sess. 532 (1998) available in 1998 WL 857390 (statement of Representative
Meehan); see also id. at 630 (statement ofRepresentative Wexler's) (stating that "censure is the
scarlet letter"); id. at 636 (statement of Representative Frank) (stating that "[h]ow do we get a
vote that expresses condemnation? One choice is ... censure"), id. at 639 (statement of
Representative Schumer) (stating that censure is the "right punishment" for President Clinton);
id at 698 (statement of Representative Rothman) (stating that 1 feel it incumbent upon
myself ... to prove... the president can't lie to us, he cannot behave dishonorably in our White
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debates in the full House unequivocally express the same intent, to punish the
President, a power expressly forbidden to Congress under the attainder clause.136
House Minority leader Richard Gephardt stated that he felt Congress should
"penaliz[e] this President with censure and not impeachment"1 37
Unlike the Nixon case, where Congress evinced no intent to punish Nixon for
his blameworthiness, 38 the only recognizable intent found in the debates over the
censure of President Clinton is to punish. The Nixon Court specifically found that
the available legislative history surrounding the Act to reclaim Nixon's
Presidential materials "cast no aspersions on [Nixon's] personal conduct and
contain[ed] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of
punishment."'1 39 The legislative record pertaining to President Clinton's proposed
censure invokes a major concern which prompted the inclusion of the attainder
clause in the Constitution, "the fear that the legislature, in seeking to pander to an
inflamed popular constituency, will find it expedient openly to assume the mantle
ofjudge .... ,140 This is exemplified in Minority Leader Gephardt's remarks that
Republicans were denying Democrats a chance to act on public opinion by not
allowing a vote on censure: "I believe the majority is ... disregarding ... the
wishes of a vast majority of the American people regarding penalizing this
President with censure .... ,,141 Moreover, unlike in NrIxon, Congress never
provided for judicial review to protect any legal or constitutional rights President
Clinton might have regarding being censured.142
House and not be punished... and that's why I support these grounds for censure.").
136 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("[N]o Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed").
137 144 CONG. REC. Hi1,778 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gephardt).
Numerous other examples abound which are determinative of Congressional intent to punish,
but only a few examples should be necessary to demonstrate this intent. See id. at HI 1,779
(statement of Rep. Mendez) (stating that "[a] censure would put an indelible sear upon the
President's place in history, something we all know this President cares about deeply. It is a
tough, just, and appropriate punishment'); id. at H11,785 (statement of Judiciary Committee
member Rep. Schumer) (stating that "the proper punishment is censure, not impeachment'); id
at HI 1,803 (statement of Rep. Hall) (stating that "[c]ensure is a harsh enough punishment It
expresses the profound disappointment of the American people, and it will stay with the
President for the rest of his life and throughout history"); id. at Hi 1,813 (statement of Rep.
Obey) (stating that "to those who say censure has no bite, my response is this: I come from the
State of Joe McCarthy. Tell him censure has no bite. It destroyed him"); id. at H11,818
(statement of Rep. Holden) (stating that "the President should be punished and should be
censured"); id. at HI1,833 (statement of Rep. Doggett) (stating that that Congress should
"[punish the President with a punishment that fits the crime .... Censure and move on").
138 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425,479 (1977).
139 Id.
140 Id. at 480.
141 144 CONG. REC. 11,778 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998) (statement of Rep. Gephardt).
142 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480-82.
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The final step in the Nixon test is whether less burdensome alternatives exist
whereby Congress can achieve its legitimate nonpunitive objectives.143 This
aspect of the Nixon test is certainly less relevant here, since no other objectives
could have existed except to punish President Clinton. In fact, censure was
proposed as an alternative to impeachment, a procedure expressly provided to
judge the President's guilt or innocence. This asserted judicial character of a
censure resolution strengthens the conclusion that it is a Bill of Attainder.
2. Censure as a "Scarlet Letter" 44
Aside from a jurisprudential analysis of the Bill of Attainder clause, it is
possible to determine whether censure has a punitive nature through comparative
means. Do the effects of a censure mirror any common punishments seen during
early or present American history? Moreover, do the purposes that censure is
meant to serve comport with traditional aims of punishment namely retribution
and deterrence? This Section argues that censure has the effect of shaming or
stigmatizing its recipient
Shaming punishments began in this country during colonial America.145
Such punishments included the stocks and pillories, often accompanied by an
order that the criminals bear a sign designating their offenses, 146 forced public
apologies, 147 the ducking stool,148 the bilbo,149 public whippings, 150 and, of
143 See id. at 482.
144 The term "scarlet letter" is based on Nathaniel Hawthorne's famous novel, in which
the heroine, Hester Pryne, is forced to wear a scarlet "A" on her dress which proclaims her an
adulteress. See NATHANIEL HAWrHORNE, THE ScARLEr LErrER 57 (St. Martin's 1991) ("ITihe
point which drew all eyes... was that Scarlet Letter.").
145 See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L.
REv. 1880, 1912-14 (1991) (discussing colonial shaming penalties); Phaedra Athena O'Hara
Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and Eighth
Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions, 77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 804
(1999) (arguing that scarlet letter probation conditions do not violate the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
146 See Massaro, supra note 145, at 1913; Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlet
Letter: A Critical Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1357, 1361
(stating that "[t]he stocks and pillory inflicted primarily psychological rather than physical
punishment.").
147 See Massaro, supra note 144, at 1913.
148 A common punishment device for women, the ducking stool was a seat attached to a
plank which sat over water. The criminal, who was tied to the chair, would be "ducked" into the
water. See Massaro, supra note 145, at 1914; Kelly, supra note 145, at 805 n. 192.
149 This was an iron bar which locked together a prisoner's legs with two sliding shackles.
See Massaro, supra note 145, at 1913-14.
150 See Kelly, supra note 145, at 804.
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course, stigmatizing labels.151 Though largely discontinued in this country when
imprisonment became the favored norm, shaming punishments have experienced
a form of renaissance.152 Congressional censure of the President bears a striking
resemblance to a shaming or staining punishment, adding to its nature as a Bill of
Attainder.
Shaming is punishunent. 153 Even those who are averse to its use recognize
this truth. 154 Shaming is a means of expressing society's moral condemnation of
an offender's actions.155 In this respect, shaming punishments are similar to
aspects of imprisonment, fines, and community service in that it expresses
aversion to wrongs committed by imposing a penalty.' 56 This is expressive
theory, recognizing that one of the proper purposes of punishment is that of
communicating to the offender and society that an act or action is opprobrious
and deserving of condermnation. 157 Jeremy Bentham recognized this when he
stated that punishment should "answer the purpose of a moral lesson':
A punishment may be said to be calculated to answer the purpose of a moral
15 1 In addition to Hawthorne's infamous scarlet letter, branding was also practiced. See
Massaro, supra note 145, at 1913. It is this last form of shaming which concerns the author's
attention in this Section. History and the public may brand the President but, consistent with the
Constitution, Congress may not
152 See Dan M. Kahan, Wat Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591,
631-37 (1996) (discussing the positive merits of shaming punishments). Many examples exist
of recent shaming punishments. For example, a woman convicted of drug possession was
ordered to stand on a street corner wearing a sign that read, "I got caught possessing cocaine.
Ordered by Judge Whitfield." Eye on America, CBS Morning News (CBS television broadcast,
May 16, 1997). A man convicted of driving while intoxicated was ordered to paste a bumper
sticker to his car that read, "CONVICTED: DWI." People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E2d 146, 147
(N.Y. 1995). For a comprehensive exposition on various shaming punishments, see generally
Stephen P. Garvey, Can ShamingPunishments Educate?, 65 U. CHi. L. REv. 733 (1998).
153 See E.B. v. Veniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1099 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that colonial shaming
practices "inflicted punishment because they either physically held the person up before his or
her fellow citizens for shaming or physically removed him or her from the community.');
Garvey, supra note 152, at 737 ("[TIhese punishments expose the offender to public view and
heap ignominy upon him.... ); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and
Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 384 (1997) ("[Tjhese punishments convey condemnation in
dramatic and unequivocal terms."); Kahan, supra note 152, at 631-35 ("[S]haming
penalties... express appropriate moral condemnation."); Massaro, supra note 145, at 1886
(stating that shaming techniques are "penalties"); Kelly, supra note 145, at 809
("[C]ommentators. . . agree that the new shaming techniques are a form of punishment....').
154 See James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE
LJ. 1055, 1057-59 (1998) (acknowledging that shaming can be justified under traditional
theories of punishment, but seeing shaming as "a species of official lynch justice.").
155 See Kahan, supra note 153, at 384.
15 6 See Kelly, supra note 145, at 809 n. 220.
157 See Kahan, supra note 153, at 594.
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lesson, when, by reason of the ignominy it stamps upon the offen[se], it is
calculated to inspire the public with sentiments of aversion towards those
pernicious habits and dispositions with which the offence appears to be
connected; and thereby to inculcate the opposite beneficial habits and
dispositions. 158
A censure of the President falls neatly into the expressive theory of
punishment and, more specifically, can be seen as a shaming punishment.
Censure expresses Congress' condemnation and rebuke of whatever actions
happen to be the target of the censure. 159 It expresses the legislature's viewpoint
as the people's representatives, that the President is worthy of blameworthiness
and is guilty of some act which must be conveyed to society as wrong.160
Censure, like other shaming penalties, will "[inflict] disgrace and contumely in a
dramatic and spectacular manner." 161
Censure, in essence, is a stigmatization or stain on the President Clearly,
Presidents value their legacies; history's judgment is important to them. The
"scarlet letter" of being censured is something that will never be erased from
history.16 2 This etemal stain on a Presidency will never be forgotten, a fact
pointed out by censure proponents in the House during the debates over censuring
President Clinton. 163 Andrew Jackson felt that this stain was the most painful
punishment Congress could prescribe:
158 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCHiON TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MoRALs AND
LEGISLATION 171 (J.H. Burns & H.LA Hart eds., The Athlone Press 1970).
159 This sense of condermation and rebuke was a recurring theme during the House
debates on President Clinton's censure. For example, Representative Bonior stated that: "The
American people are looking for a solution that condemns the President's wrongdoing.. ..
144 CONG. REC. Hl1,779 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1998); Representative Menendez stated that he
believed "the President's actions were reprehensible and worthy of condemnation." Id.
160 Though few dispute the wrongful nature of President Clinton's actions, it must be
remembered that some acts which might be potential targets of censure will be either so arcane
as to not be well understood by the public, such as Andrew Jackson's Bank War, see supra Part
IL or will command such a split in public opinion as to the wrongfulness of the act that
congressional resolution of its blameworthiness will carry great weight.
161 Goldschmitt v. State, 490 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1986) (citing United
States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911,913 (8th Cir. 1983)).162 Reall that although Andrew Jackson's censure was subsequently expunged, history
has certainly taken note of its occurrence and it is likely that most accounts focus more on the
actual censure than its expungement.
163 See spra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
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[hough neither removal from office nor future disqualification ensues, yet it is
not to be presumed that the framers of the Constitution considered either or both
of those results as constituting the whole of the punishment they prescribed. The
judgment ofguilty by the highest tribunal in the Union, the stigma it would inflict
on the offender, his family, and fame, and the perpetual record on the Journal,
handing down to future generations the story of his disgrace, were doubtless
regarded by them as the bitterest portions, if not the very essence, of that
punishment.164
This stigma, as recognized by Blackstone, was a hallmark characteristic of
being attainted: "He is then called attaint, attinctus, stained or blackened. He is no
longer of any credit or reputation."165
Thus, there can be no doubt that censure of a President is a Bill of Attainder.
Censure is a "legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial lrial.",166
It is clearly punishment. It has been historically considered as punishment,167 no
alternative legitimate regulatory or legislative purpose exists for its use,168
congressional intent is clearly of a punitive nature,169 and the penalty prescribed
is eternal stigma' 70 An attainted President is forced to bear the scarlet letter "C"
in history as deserving of condemnation and of a judgment of blameworthiness
and guilt Most important the Framers expressly spoke to the issue of attainting
the President and decided to forbid its use.171
IV. OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. A Lack of Constitutional Basis
In addition to violating the attainder clause, censure lacks an express
constitutional basis. Congress is expressly granted the plenary power to "punish
its Members for disorderly Behav[ior], and with the Concurrence of two thirds,
expel a Member.' 172 The bifurcated power of impeachment in the House' 73 and
trial in the Senate174 also grants Congress the power to expel a President.
164 3 PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 13, at 1294.
165 4 WmLiAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES *380.
166 Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,323 (1866).
167 See supra notes 121-31 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 135-45 and accompanying text.
170 See supra discussion Pat Jll.C2.
171 See 5 ELLIOT's DEBATES, supra note 82, at 528.
172 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Congress has exercised this power to punish its own
members through the use of censure. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
17 3 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
174 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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However, the absence in the Constitution of a corresponding power to 'punish
[the President] for disorderly behavior" provides a negative implication that the
power is not intended.
The interpretive maxim "expressio ... unius est exclusio alterius" means
"inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of the other."175 Relative to the power
to censure a President, the maxim suggests the power was not meant to exist. This
conclusion is strengthened by the Supreme Court's holding in Kilbourn v.
Thompson.' 76 In that case, the Supreme Court held that Congress had no power to
declare a witness in contempt for refusing to answer questions concerning his
business because Congress does not possess the "power of making inquiry into
the private affairs of the citizen."'1 77 In so holding, the Court reasoned that "no
judicial power is vested in the Congress or either branch of it save in the cases
specifically enumerated in the Constitution. 178 Had the Framers of the
Constitution intended some other means to address presidential misconduct they
would have said so in clear and intelligible language.
For this reason, recent supporters of censure have argued that the power to
censure the President is incidental to the power to impeach and remove from
office. To be sure, impeachment and removal from office of a President will
punish him, but that is not the intended purpose of the impeachment process. The
purpose of the impeachment power is to defend "the [c]ommunity [against] the
incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the [C]hief Magistrate" because "either of
them might be fatal to the Republic."'1 79 The power of impeachment is provided
to guard the country against a President who cannot be trusted; it is a remedial
mechanism, designed to cleanse and purify the office. If a President acts "in such
17 5 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MAERIALS ON
LEGSsLATION; STATurES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES 638-39 (2d ed. 1995).
176 103 U.S. 168 (1880); see also, United States v. Williams, 15 F.3d 1356, 1361 (6th Cir.
1994). In Williams, the Sixth Circuit stated:
[A] positive ascription of power to a particular branch may be taken to imply a negative
prohibition on the exercise of a similar power by the other two branches. For example, the
fact that the Constitution grants the President 'power to grant reprieves and pardons for
offenses against the United States'... implies that the other branches do not have this
power.
Id.
177 Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 190.
178 Id. at 192-93.
179 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6 at 64-69; SIMPsON, supra
note 6, at 11-12. Governor Morris voiced his concern that the President "may be bribed by a
greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we ought to expose ourselves to
the danger of seeing the first Magistrate in foreign pay without being able to guard against it by
displacing him" Id. at 13.
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a manner as to render [him] unworthy of being any longer trusted," 180 the
Constitution provides a means to replace him with another. It is the preservation
of public liberties and the Constitution from an untrustworthy or dangerous
President which is impeachment's mission.
Censure, on the other hand, achieves none of these purposes. It punishes the
President without cleansing the office. No defense of the Constitution is served by
punishing a President; no public liberties are safeguarded by its use. On the
contrary, public liberties are imperiled by its existence.181 The threat of censure
may hang over a President's head who fears more for his legacy than his
principles. After being censured, a President is necessarily weakened. He is then
rendered incapable of performing his job the way he did before. Congress has
siphoned his power to itself and the result may be an erosion of liberties. This is
so because liberty's primary safeguard, the separation of powers, 182 is inevitably
undermined.
B. The Dangers of Censure
The conclusion that an act violates the Constitution does not always prove the
danger entailed in the violation. Therefore, it is necessary to reexamine the
dangers sought to be avoided and the principles sought to be preserved when the
attainder clause was included in the Constitution.
The inclusion of the attainder clause was intended to serve the function of
separation of powers. 183 The fundamental danger sought to be avoided was the
legislative assumption of judicial powers.184 A censure of the President carries
with it all of the inequities and dangers which originally prompted the inclusion of
the attainder clause in the Constitution. First, legislative trials do not possess the
normal forms and safeguards inherent in a judicial trial.185 In the absence of
formal due process, a President is likely to be confronted with procedural
irregularities and inequities he cannot prepare for or defend against For example,
the President's accusers are likely to be both the judge and jury at his trial. The
fundamental fairness ordinary citizens expect at trial would be subsumed by what
is likely to be a majority bent on exacting a political price on the President Any
expectation that due process would direct the trial is extinguished by the reality
that the Congress is already subverting the Constitution through consideration of
the attainder.
180 THM FEDERAisTNo. 70, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
181 This theme is more fully developed in the next section. See infra discussion Part IV.B.
182 See THEFEDERALISTNo. 51, at 347-48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
183 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965).
184 See id.
185 See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977); Brown,
381 U.S. at 445 (1965); Cummings v. State of Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,323 (1866).
1006 [Vol. 61:979
CENSURING THE PRESIDENT
Second, and most dangerous, is the fact that Congress, in hearing the charge,
might be too concerned with the popular passions and clamor of its constituents to
impartially try the accused.i86 There is little political risk in condemning and
branding a President lacking in popular suppqrt a far greater political peril exists
for those legislators who ignore public opinion. Moreover, can it be doubted that
an antagonistic majority party would forsake the opportunity of weakening a
political opponent? Minor considerations such as the guilt or innocence of the
accused President will inevitably be ignored for partisan purposes. For these
reasons, "no judicial power is vested in the Congress... save in the cases
specifically enumerated."18 7
Unfortunately, an attainder of the President carries with it a far greater danger
to this country: legislative encroachment on the executive branch. As noted by the
Supreme Court; "the principle of separation of powers was not simply an abstract
generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the documents that
they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."188 This principle is
manifestly important because, as stated by James Madison in The Federalist; the
"separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government... is
admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty."1 89
Essential to the separation of powers is the power and ability of the Executive
Branch to perform its intended functions and withstand encroachment by the
other branches. Without this ability, another branch, formerly coequal, can seize
power which may unsettle the foundations of our government inherently tending
towards tyranny. 19° Alexander Hamilton eloquently described the necessary
ingredient to maintain this equilibrium when he stated in The Federalist:
186 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469,480; Brown, 381 U.S. at 443-46; Cwnmings, 71 U.S. at
323; STORY, supra note 68, at § 1344. As was stated in Brown:
mhe Bill of Attainder Clause not only was intended as one implementation of the general
principle of fiactionalized power, but also reflected the Framers' belief that the Legislative
Branch is not so well suited as politically independent judges and juries to the task of
ruling upon the blameworthiness ot and levying appropriate punishment upon, specific
persons.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 445.
187 Kilboum v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 192-93 (1880).
188 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983) (invalidating the "legislative veto" as
unconstitutional under separation of powers principles); see also, New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 181-82 (1992) (holding that states cannot "consent" to the enlargement of
Congressional power); Nixon, 433 U.S, at 443 (1977); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295
U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935) (holding that Congress has the authority to prescribe causes for
removal by the President of members of the Federal Trade Commission).
189 THEFEDERAsTNO. 51, at 348 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
190 See MON QuIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAws 151-52 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949);
JOHN E. NowAx, ErAL, CONSWmUONALLAW 121 (3d ed., 1986).
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Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good
government It is essential to the protection... against foreign attacks; it is not
less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of
property against those irregular and highhanded combinations which sometimes
interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of liberty against the
enterprises and assaults of ambition, faction, and of anarchy.191
Without this "energy," Presidents become bit players in the business of
running the government; liberties formerly guarded by the Executive Branch may
crumble in the absence of power to preserve them; foreign policy may suffer
because the President lacks "energy" to direct it; law enforcement efforts may be
undermined by society's realization that there is little ability to enforce the law. In
short, a lack of appropriate power in the Executive Branch is a danger to be
prevented.
The branch of government the Framers were most concerned would enervate
Executive "energy" was the Legislative Branch.192 In accordance with this fear, it
was the Framers' "profound conviction" that Congress's powers "were the
powers to be most carefully circumscribed." 193 The specter of censure enlarges
Congress's power by allowing it the power to punish the President, a power
surely not granted conversely to the President to punish members of Congress.
Already, each house of Congress has the bifurcated power of impeachment or
removal, a power the Framers feared would weaken the Presidency too much by
itself.194 However, at least in theory and regardless of the President's ultimate
guilt or innocence, the process of impeachment would be an act of cleansing the
191 THEFEDERALISTNO. 70, at471 (Alexander Harnilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
192 As stated by Alexander Hamilton:
The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb every other, has been fully displayed
and illustrated by examples in some preceeding numbers. In governments purely
republican, this tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people, in a
popular assembly, seems sometimes to fancy, that they are the people themselves, and
betray strong symptoms of impatience and disgust at the least sign of opposition from any
other quarter .... They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the other
departments; and... make it very difficult for the other members of the govenment to
maintain the balance of the constitution.
THE FEDERALIsTNO. 71, at 483-84 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
193 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 947.
194 James Madison felt that the inclusion of the impeachment clause in the Constitution
was necessary but made the President "im'roperly dependent" on the Congress. See 5 ELuOT's
DEBATES, supra note 92, at 528. Governor Morris "was against a dependence of the executive
on the legislature, considering the legislative tyranny the great danger to be apprehended:' Id.
Mr. Pinckney "disapproved of making the Senate the court of impeachments, as rendering the
President too dependent on the legislature:' Id.
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office,195 not one of disabling or one which would create future dependence by
the existing Executive on the Legislature.
Congressional censure of the President carries with it the danger of
destroying this Executive energy because it is a weapon which can and has been
used to influence presidential decisionmaking. Recall that President Jackson was
censured for acts which were certainly within his constitutional prerogatives. 196
Had Jackson been cowed by the intimidation of the Senate, the equilibrium of the
separation of powers would have been severely altered. First, Presidents thereafter
would have had justifiable fear that any use of the veto power would subject them
to legislative punishment Second, the power of Presidents to remove cabinet
officers would have been severely curtailed, if not subjected purely to legislative
approval. Third, and most sweeping, future Presidents would have had to worry
about legislative retribution each time they acted in opposition to strongly held
legislative opinion. Jackson foresaw the dangerous consequences of the Senate's
action when he stated:
If by a mere denunciation like this resolution the President should ever be
induced to act in a matter of official duty contrary to the honest convictions of his
own mind in compliance with the wishes of the Senate, the constitutional
independence of the executive department would be as effectually destroyed and
its power as effectually transferred to the Senate as if that end had been
accomplished by an amendment of the Constitution. 197
The dangers President Jackson foresaw could present themselves in many
ways. A hypothetical situation will demonstrate these dangers.198 Let us assume
that the Congress and Presidency are controlled by different parties, and that
antagonists to the President have some evidence of potential illegal activity. In
addition, Congress is frustrated by the blocking of their agenda through the
President's constant use of the veto. Breaking the story of the potentially illegal
activity, the President's congressional opponents soon realize that the public does
not perceive the alleged event to be serious enough to warrant removal from
office. Congress thus begins hearings on whether to censure the President, but it
appears the vote will be a narrow one, with five or so votes being decisive of the
outcome. Knowing he is innocent of the charges, the President quickly realizes
that the best way to be so adjudged in history is to begin currying favor with
195 As Alexander Hamilton noted, the process of impeachment in the House and trial in
the Senate is designed "to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most
distinguished characters of the community." THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 442 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
196 See supra iscussion Part II.
197 3 PAPERS OFT-EPRESiDENT, supranote 13, at 1305.
19 8 Of course, real life is often richer than fiction, and this hypothetical is simply meant to
illustrate that the prospect of censure may lead an irresolute President to bend the honest
convictions of his own mind in return for escaping historical disgrace and infamy.
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Congress by acceding to the congressional agenda he once opposed. Striking a
deal with the President whereby he promises to sign offered legislation, Congress
drops the consideration of censure. For ill or good, the balance of power between
the Executive and Legislative branches has effectually been destroyed,
Congressional opponents know the President will protect his legacy more than his
principles.
Of course, any number of situations could present themselves in which the
threat of censure will become a weapon to prevent the President's just exercise of
his powers. The situation need not be surreptitious; the facts underlying President
Jackson's censure by Congress were well known to the American public. 199
Though Jackson was acting constitutionally proper in firing his Treasury
Secretary, employing the veto and removing the deposits from the Second Bank
of the United States, public opinion was against his actions.2 00 For that reason,
there was little popular recrimination against those who supported Jackson's
censure.
The threat of allowing Congress power to condemn a President is tangible.
The Constitution provides a framework of coequality between the different
branches of government demanding that one cannot be the master of another;20 1
for Congress to assert a power to censure the President thus implies a paternalistic
role never intended. The prospect of censure inevitably weakens the "energy" of
the Executive Branch- Through an inevitable lack of due process, by Congress's
susceptibility to popular opinion and clamor, and through the threat of the "scarlet
letter" should a President disobey congressional fiat. Furthermore, congressional
assumption of this power is not subject to any express defense by the
President.202 Short term popular support for censure might be high in a given
199 The Bank issue was a leading one in the 1832 election. See REMINI, supra note 11, at
88-108.
200 Jackson attempted to not make the recharter veto a major issue during the 1832
election because of the "Bank's widespread support."Id. at 96.
2 01 Alexander Hamilton expressly spoke to this issue. He stated:
If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the legislative body, to invade the ights
of the executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves
teach us, that the one ought not to be left at the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a
constitutional and effectual power of self defence.
THE FEDERALLST NO. 73, at 494-95 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961). Censure
leaves the President at the unchecked '"mercy" of Congress, without a provision for defense.
202 In theory, the President could use the veto power to defend himself, but the danger
might exist that exercise of the veto would subject him to impeachment and removal from
office. In addition, Congress could simply pass a non.binding resolution not requiring
presidential approval and not subject to the veto. Regardless of that outcome, the point is that
the President is vulnerable to improper legislative influence. Of course, a President censured
could appeal to the Supreme Court for protection, but many issues arise. Judicial review of
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situation, but the long term effects of its threatened use are potentially disastrous
because the power to punish is the power to influence and control.
V. CONCLUSION
By now, it should be readily apparent that censure violates the Constitution.
Hopefully, this Note has also sufficiently explained the dangers inherent in the
violation. Because of the intimate dependence of Congress upon the people, it is
ill suited to try with impartiality and caution a charge in which the popular feeling
is excited. 0 3 No constitutional protection is provided to a President to ensure a
fair hearing of any accusation. Furthermore, as an alternative to impeachment,
censure distracts from the pertinent issue: Does the country need to be protected
from the President? If so, the Constitution provides a means to remedy the
President's "incapacity, negligence or perfidy.'u °4 If fit to continue in office, the
President should not be made improperly dependent on Congress through the
threat of censure;205 the dangers of legislative encroachment on the Executive
Branch were all too familiar to our founding fathers.
The very definition of equality rejects the existence of unchecked power by
one branch of government over another. The ability of one branch to punish
another thus enervates the principle of separation of powers. Though our
government's coordinate branches may never truly be completely equal to each
other, censure augments the power of the branch the Framers were most
concerned would encroach on the others: Congress. 06 In augmenting
congressional power, censure diminishes executive power. Congressional control
over a President's legacy is invariably a characteristic of bad government; the
censure is beyond the scope of this Note, but suffice it to say that no President would care to
place much confidence in what the ultimate outcome might be.
203 Of course, this danger exists to an extent with the process of impeachment However,
the system of checks and balances provided in the Constitution's impeachment clauses make it
very difficult for a party to unilaterally remove a president from office. Obviously, the same
cannot be said for censure; both houses attempted to independently censure President Clinton,
and with only a majority needed for passage.
204 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 6, at 64-69; SMPSON, supra
note 6, at 11.
205 It may be important to note here that in our modem media-crazed world, the public
will have ample opportunity to inquire and determine the true nature of a president's guilt or
innocence. Congress's judgment will of course sway some minds, but will be largely
unnecessary to inform the public at large. If this is true, then the intended effect of censure must
be to punish a president for time immemorial. In fact, this was a common theme during the
House of Representatives' debate over censure. For example, Representative Menendez stated
that "[a] censure would put an indelible scar upon the President's place in history, something
we all know this President cares about deeply." 144 CONG. REC. HI 1,779 (daily ed. Dec. 18,
1998).
206 See TE FEDERALISTNO. 51, at 351-52 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 1961).
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prospect of censure hanging over the head of a President unavoidably
compromises his ability to perform the executive functions necessary to the
preservation of fundamental liberties.
Whether employed in a given situation with virtuous or corrupt intentions, the
existence of censure as a legislative weapon is inevitably a destabilizing
influence. This country's recent encounter with the process of impeachment
demonstrates the ill borne out of any clash between governmental branches; the
process of government is put on hold as two poweful entities battle for "victory."
No laws are passed or reforms made when the political survival of a President is
at stake. Moreover, the acrimony continues when the process ends, further
destabilizing the government. President Andrew Jackson experienced the dangers
of censure firsthand:
If the censures of the Senate be submitted to by the President the
confidence of the people in his ability and virtue and the character and usefulness
of his Administration will soon be at an end, and the real power of the
Government will fall into the hands of a body holding their offices for long
terms .... If on the other hand, the illegal censures of the Senate should be
resisted by the President; collisions and angry controversies might ensue,
discreditable in their progress and in the end compelling the people to adopt the
conclusion either that their Chief Magistrate was unworthy of their respect or that
the Senate was chargeable with calumny and injustice. Either of these results
would impair public confidence in the perfection of the system and lead to
serious alterations of its framework or to the practical abandonment of some of
its provisions.207
207 3 PAPERS OFTiEPRESIDENT, supra note 13, at 1310.
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